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Introduction
Consumer demand models -an important part of applied welfare economic analysis -are standard tools used to evaluate the welfare effects of tax policy reforms as well as changes in other circumstances faced by consumers. Such models, which can be used to analyze changes in direct and indirect taxation, in relative prices (induced by market forces or by subsidies), in benefit systems, or in transfer schemes, have been widely estimated using data from both developing and developed countries. The literature is too vast to be cited here.
To be used for welfare analysis, demand systems that describe the adjustment of expenditure shares to total expenditure and relative prices have to be consistent with consumer theory. Indeed, one cornerstone of this literature is that it derives estimable demand systems that are fully theoryconsistent (see, e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980 , or Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel, 1997 ).
These demand systems, which express budget shares as a function of total consumption expenditure and relative prices, are typically derived from a unitary household model. In such a model, either household members have identical preferences or one member decides for all. This results in budget shares depending on preferences and variables that affect budget constraints, but not on variables that affect only the distribution of resources within the family, such as the income share of a household member.
However, a large body of evidence points to the rejection of the unitary model in favor of models in which agents have different preferences. Browning and Chiappori (1998) , for example, show that budget shares depend on the wife's share of household income, conditional on total consumption. Therefore, household behavior is often best represented as a process of allocation of resources between two (or more) individuals with different utility functions.
Unfortunately, no consensus has emerged on an alternative model that could be used for policy and welfare analysis. This lack of consensus and accepted standards is in part due to the difficulty of deriving a demand system for household demand consistent with a non unitary model, even for the models that have been more extensively used (such as the collective model proposed by Chiappori (1988) and Browning and Chiappori (1998) among others). This is due partly to the very limited information available on private consumption within the household and partly to the difficulty in identifying the sharing rules that determine the allocation of resources within the household and possibly the prevalence of one spouse's preferences rather than the other's. Theory is silent about the factors that determine bargaining power and information on these factors is often limited. Many 'rejections' of the unitary model can conceivably be explained away by the possibility that factors that are claimed to determine bargaining power are instead affecting the preferences of a unitary household.
The tests of the unitary model are typically run using observational data from developed countries or from primarily rural areas of developing countries. 1 Recently, data collected for the evaluation of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have also been used to test (and reject) the unitary model. CCT programs provide cash payments to poor families conditional on making health investments in young children and their mothers and on sending older children to school.
These programs, which have become extremely popular interventions in the developing world, hand in the transfers to the mothers of the children whose education is subsidized, provided that these women attend classes on nutrition and health. CCT programs, therefore, can change household demand in two ways: (i) by changing both total household income and the relative incomes of the household members, and (ii) by changing nutrition and health knowledge and preferences.
Using data collected for the evaluation of CCT programs is advantageous because the program changes women's income, which enables one to perform testsà la Browning and Chiappori (1998) .
Moreover, the program geographic phase-in -often coupled with a randomization -enables one to compare the behavior of similar households, some of which receive the program transfers and some of which do not. This reduces and simplifies the identification assumptions required to run these tests. Consequently, there is abundant evidence on how household demand might be affected by CCTs, as we discuss in the next section. This evidence is from rural areas.
The literature has two shortcomings. First, hardly any evidence is available from the urban areas of developing countries. This evidence is greatly needed, as it is important to understand the behavior of the urban poor in a rapidly urbanizing world. The behavior of poor, urban consumers may differ from that of their rural counterparts, if nothing else because they have much less access to food production opportunities. Second, as we discussed, some of the rejections of the unitary model can be rationalized as changes in the preferences of the unitary household, especially in the context of CCT programs whose goal is to improve beneficiaries' health and nutrition behavior.
We summarize our contribution to the literature after describing the content of this paper.
We start from a standard unitary demand system, which we estimate on a sample of poor urban households in Mexico. The data we use were collected to evaluate the impact of a large conditional cash transfer program, Oportunidades. This program operates only in some of the areas included in our survey and only for some of the time considered. We can use this policy variation and the quasi-experimental design to evaluate the program's impact and validate our theoretical model. We choose Oportunidades, the Mexican poverty alleviation program, for two reasons. First, in some sense this is the prototypical CCT program. Oportunidades was the first CCT to be launched on a national scale and to be subjected to a rigorous evaluation. Deemed a success, it is now the flagship welfare program of the Mexican government and the main such program by a large margin, as it covers more than one in ten Mexicans. Because of this success, CCT programs were set up in a large number of countries both within and outside Latin America.
Second, Oportunidades provides data from urban areas, for which less is known about the impact of CCTs.
The test we propose is simple. Consider a simplified demand model for household i, where the Wales (1997), Duflo and Udry (2003) , Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg (2002) , Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) , Rangel and Thomas (2005) , and Akresh (2008) .
budget share of a commodity, w, is a function of consumption expenditure, c: w i = βf (c i ) + ϵ i .
With a consistent estimate of the parameter β, one can predict by how much the expected value of w changes for any change in f (c) under the null hypothesis that the model is correct. Our test consists of estimating the Average Intent to Treat (AIT) effects of Oportunidades on w and f (c),
AIT w and AIT f (c) ; that is, by how much average commodity budget shares and (some function of) consumption have changed for households eligible for the program. If the demand model is correct, then the commodity budget share AIT is the product of the consumption AIT and the coefficient from the demand model, AIT w = βAIT f (c) .
To perform this test, we have to deal with a number of methodological issues. First, we have to determine the appropriate functional form of f (c) in our setting. Second, we have to deal with the fact that we do not observe commodity prices. Third, we have to address the endogeneity of consumption in the demand model. Lastly, we have to find (and provide indirect evidence for) a set of assumptions to identify and estimate the average treatment effects in a setting in which program eligibility was not randomly allocated.
Our main results in terms of impacts are that: (i) the shares of both food consumption and high-protein food increase by a statistically significant amount; (ii) their increases are by a larger magnitude than the increase in total consumption; and (iii) the share of high-protein food increases considerably, as a fraction of both total consumption and food consumption. 2 When we estimate Engel curves, taking into account the methodological issues discussed above and using data collected before the introduction of the program, we find that food is a necessity and high-protein food a luxury. Armed with these estimates of the Engel curves and with the impact of the program on total consumption, we can predict the impacts of the program on expenditure shares and compare them to the quasi-experimental impacts. On the basis of this comparison, we strongly reject the specification of our model. The main reason for this finding, mechanically, is that in the case of the share of food, the experimental evidence shows an increase, while the Engel curve, showing food as a necessity, predicts a decline. In the case of high-protein food, both the experimental evidence and the Engel curve predict an increase, but it is much larger the former than in the latter.
Given our rejection of the basic model, we check whether the program changes some of its parameters. In a sense, our exercise recognizes that the basic model is not 'structural' with respect to the CCT in the sense of Lucas (1976) , as its parameters move with it. Two pieces of evidence confirm this conjecture. First, when we estimate the same Engel curves using data collected in 2004, after the program was started, we find that the estimated parameters are similar to the ones from 2002 in control areas, but change significantly (both statistically and in magnitude) in treatment areas. Second, when we use the estimated coefficient of log expenditure from the demand curves estimated in 2002 (and in 2004 from control areas), we fail to predict the estimated average treatment effect of the program on food shares and high-protein food shares. Under the assumption that we have consistent estimates of the average treatment effects, this test rejects the null hypothesis that the demand curve is correctly specified.
The interesting question, of course, is what is the reason for the structural instability of our model. We propose two explanations for this discrepancy between the estimates of the demand models and of the average treatment effects. One is that the demand curve is based on the erroneous unitary household model, which assumes either homogeneous preferences of the household members or having one decision-maker in the household. If members' preferences differ and decisions, which are taken jointly, depend on relative incomes (a proxy for bargaining power), the program might change demand by increasing the female's relative income. The other explanation is that the program changes nutrition knowledge and preferences.
To distinguish between these two possibilities, we re-estimate our model on the subset of households headed by a single woman who earned most of the household income regardless of the program transfers and show that, for this group, the parameters of the model do not change with the program. This constitutes at least indirect evidence that the program changes the mechanisms through which resources are allocated within the household.
In sum, our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides evidence on household demand for the urban poor in Mexico. As a by-product of this exercise, it also establishes the impact of the program on consumption and some of its components. Second, besides testing and rejecting the unitary model using variation which is arguably exogenous, it provides indirect evidence on the possible reason for this rejection. Third, it generalizes tests of the unitary modelà la Browning and Chiappori (1998) in both empirical and conceptual ways: empirically, by estimating more flexible Engel curves; conceptually, by estimating reduced-form parameters without assuming that CCT programs change the distribution factors (as we will clarify in the next section). Lastly, we believe the paper's methodological contribution is interesting in itself for two reasons: because it deals with a series of issues for the identification and estimation of Engel curves and of treatment effects in a non-experimental setting and, as importantly, because it uses policy changes to test structural models. Papers that are relevant for this approach include 
Structural models of consumption composition
In this section, we discuss a structural model that, given a total amount of consumption, determines its allocation among different commodities, for a given vector of relative prices. Effectively, we will be considering Engel curves, one of the first relationships between economic variables to have been studied empirically. That is, we will relate the consumption of a given commodity (or the share of total consumption of that commodity) to total consumption. 3 One can derive a demand system that relates expenditure shares to total expenditure, prices, and taste shifters from the optimization problem of an individual or a unitary family that maximizes the utility derived from a set of commodities, given the total amount spent. Indeed, a model in which one assumes that a unitary household maximizes utility, given a budget constraint, implies stringent restrictions on the demand system.
One widely-used system is Deaton and Muellbauer's (1980) Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), in which the share of consumption of commodity j in total consumption for household i, w j i , is given by the following expression:
The variable c i is total consumption and p a vector of N prices whose generic element is p k , the price of the kth commodity. a(p) is a price index homogeneous of degree 1, which depends on the ψ j k and α j parameters. One can allow the expenditure share to vary by family characteristics x, letting either the intercepts α j and/or the price coefficients ψ j k depend on them. The term u j i represents unobserved taste shocks. With appropriate restrictions on the parameters, the shares determined by equation (1) are theory-consistent, in that there exists a well-defined indirect utility function that gives rise to these shares. In other words, if there is a single agent and that agent is endowed with a certain utility function, one can get an equation like (1) . The literature refers to such a context, characterized by a unique decision maker, as the unitary model. 4 If the unitary model is not a good description of the decision process that determines expenditure shares, expenditure shares will not necessarily be described by equation (1) . And even if a similar equation were a decent approximation, the cross-equation restrictions implied by the unitary model would, in all likelihood, not hold.
Alas, such a model does not appear to be a realistic representation of reality. Introspection and anecdotal evidence suggest that households have multiple decision-makers with different preferences. Bargaining models, where demand is a function not only of preferences and budget constraints, but also of the relative 'power' of different household members, seem more realistic.
The demand function's details that better describe actual expenditure shares will depend on the specific model of intra-household allocation one uses. 5 A model that has received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, partly because of its tractability, is the so-called collective 3 In what follows, we will be using expenditure and consumption interchangeably. This approach is justified by the fact that we focus on non durable commodities and by the fact that, for urban households, consumption of non purchased food is relatively rare. 4 Sometimes an equation like (1) is estimated separately for different demographic groups (as defined, for instance, by family composition), therefore allowing for greater flexibility in the way in which these variables affect demand. The unitary model, however, imposes restrictions on the coefficients of equation (1), which guarantee homogeneity, adding-up, and Slutsky symmetry, for each stratum on which the equation is estimated. At an empirical level, most of the papers using the introduction of CCTs as a proxy or instrument for a change in distribution factors overlook the fact that CCTs change knowledge too.
As we explain below, in order to receive the transfer, eligible women must attend some classes on nutrition and health. If this knowledge shock has a direct effect on demand, which is not unlikely, the CCT might change household behavior through both a change in distribution factors and a change in preferences (which may or may not interact with expenditures). In this case, using program eligibility as an instrument for a spouse's income share would be incorrect, as the instrument is nonexcludable.
We address these shortcomings as follows. We use an AIDS structure to approximate household demand, in absence of an alternative model. However, we let the parameters of the demand system be a function of time, t, (before and after the introduction of the CCT) and space, z, (whether the households live in areas where the program is offered or not). We can therefore rewrite equation (1) as:
Notice that equation (2) does not depend explicitly on prices. This omission reflects the fact that the Oportunidades data set does not contain information on prices. As a consequence, we are unable to estimate price elasticities. However, we control for possible price effects by allowing for state fixed effects.
Equation (2) have an intercept shift (although the intercept is different for each stratum they consider).
We conclude this section with one important remark. Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997) stress the importance of accounting for potential nonlinearities in log expenditure, and generalize the AIDS structure by adding the product of a price index and a quadratic term in the log of total expenditure in equation (1) . This additional term allows a greater degree of flexibility while maintaining integrability and consistency with theory. In the context of our exercise, where we want to test the ability of the model to predict specific changes in consumption shares for a given change in total consumption, it is important to allow for the flexibility afforded by the quadratic specification. In our empirical work, we will be testing for the presence of nonlinearities. These nonlinearities could potentially complicate our analysis because they introduce an interaction between consumption and prices, which we do not observe. Conversely, prices enter the AIDS structure as intercept shifts and do not affect the slope of the Engel curves.
Oportunidades and its evaluation
In this paper, we study the urban component of Oportunidades, the Mexican poverty alleviation program. We chose this program for two reasons. First, in some sense, it is the prototypical CCT program. Oportunidades (initially called PROGRESA) was the first CCT to be launched on a national scale and to be subjected (in its rural component) to a rigorous evaluation. Deemed a success, it was extended and is now the flagship welfare program of the Mexican government and the main such program by a large margin, as it covers more than one in ten Mexicans. Because of this success, CCT programs were set up in a large number of countries both within and outside Latin America. Second, Oportunidades provides data from urban areas. Most of the success stories told about CCTs come from rural programs. The evidence on urban CCT is more limited.
Moreover, most studies of household demand in developing countries use data from rural areas.
In this sense, therefore, even the evidence on the demand system we present below is interesting and original in its own right.
Structure, eligibility, and benefits of the program
The main idea behind Oportunidades and many other CCTs is to offer cash (rather than inkind) transfers to poor households, but imposing some conditions that are intended to stimulate the accumulation of human capital and, therefore, pose the basis for the long run elimination of poverty. All grants are targeted to women. This is important because it can change the balance of power within the household by changing the control of resources for an important income source.
Moreover, the receipt of the grant is conditional on a number of activities related to health.
The beneficiary mother is supposed to attend some courses and meetings and, if she has young children, to take them to health centers with a certain frequency. These health-related activities can potentially change preferences by giving the beneficiries information on nutrition and diet.
However, in conversations, program officials often report that the courses are not very effective and often fail to engage the beneficiaries.
The Oportunidades grant is also conditional on school enrollment and attendance. Children, starting with the third year of primary school, receive a grant conditional on regular attendance to school. The grant is increasing in the grade attended and, after primary school, when the grant becomes substantially larger than in primary school, a gender differential is also introduced, with girls receiving more than boys.
The targeting of the program is done in several stages. First, the program targets specific geographic areas. Then, within these areas, it targets individual households. During its first phase, between 1997 and 2002, the program was developed mainly in rural Mexico, although some localities were excluded either because they were 'too marginal' or because they were not poor enough. In 2002, the government decided to expand the program to urban areas, excluding, however, large metropolitan areas with more than 1 million inhabitants. The urban areas (a definition that is usually larger than a municipality) were chosen on the basis of the prevalence of poverty in the 2000 census. Areas with the highest concentrations of poor households entered the program first, in 2002. We discuss this issue further when describing the evaluation design and strategy.
The individual targeting is based on a score that depends on a number of wealth indicators.
While the way in which eligibility is determined in rural and urban areas is essentially the same (households' scores are compared with a cut-off level above which a household is declared eligible for the program), the way in which individual households are approached and registered in the program is substantially different. In rural areas, a census is conducted in each locality and the data collected are used to compute scores and determine the eligibility of each household. In urban areas, instead, the program sets up a local office in a poor neighborhood and publicizes the program, inviting poor households to register for it. When an individual goes to the office, she is administered a questionnaire and preliminary eligibility is established. If the individual is deemed eligible, program officials are dispatched to her residence, where a full survey is administered and, upon confirmation of eligibility, the household is registered with the program.
An implication of the procedure in urban areas is that, to enter the program, individuals first have to approach the local office, without knowing for certain their eligibility status. We suspect that this uncertainty is one cause of the low program take-up rate, which was a little higher than 
Evaluation design and related issues
The program officials first established the city blocks in which the program would expand in 2002. The treatment is not random, as the program first started in the areas with the highest concentration of poor households, as per the information in the 2000 census. This implies that treatment blocks are different from control blocks. 6 The evaluation advisory group sampled blocks within treated areas and matched each block in the treatment sample to a control block with similar characteristics, based on a pre-estimated propensity score. However, the program design prevents one from using certain variables to form the propensity score. For instance, as the program was assigned to the areas with the highest concentrations of poor households, using such a variable would give no intersection between treatment and control samples.
Given the sample of treatment and control blocks, a number of individual households were sampled in both groups. These included both eligible households and a small number of ineligible households. In treatment areas, since the number of eligible households participating in the program was lower than expected, it was decided to oversample participants, also including households in blocks adjacent to the treatment blocks. The treatment sample, therefore, is choice-based and the fraction of eligible households participating in the program observed in our treatment sample is quite different from the true fraction of program participants. Fortunately, we can estimate the true proportion of participants in each block from a different data set, which we use to create weights to make the sample representative of the underlying population. We discuss this in section 4.2.
Sample and descriptive statistics
Our initial sample consists of data on 9,945 eligible households from 267 treatment and 272 control city blocks, interviewed in 2002, after households had registered for Oportunidades but before any payments had been made, and in 2004, after payments started in treatment blocks. The data provide information on the consumption of 37 types of food in the week prior to the interview. To deal with missing observations in the expenditure data, we first regress an indicator for having at least one missing expenditure variable on household income and poverty level, a dummy for missing income, an indicator for living in a treatment area, and year dummies. The results, available upon request, indicate that none of these variables is a statistically significant correlate of having missing expenditure data. Therefore, we keep as many observations as possible for each variable of interest. For example, if a household reports food expenditure but has missing nonfood expenditure data, we keep the food observation in our data set. This results in each variable having a slightly different number of valid observations. The advantage of this procedure is that, by having a larger sample, we increase the precision of the estimates. As a robustness check, we re-estimated all the key parameters, dropping all households with at least one missing observation: the sample size dropped, affecting the standard errors, but the point estimates were largely unchanged. 7 We also trim the data to account for measurement error. Since our key outcome is the change in log consumption, we trim the top and bottom percentiles of our first-differenced log consumption measures. We do that because, when true consumption is either under-or over-reported, its difference is either too large or too small (the data we trimmed are implausibly high, showing changes in consumption and the two subcategories we consider of almost 200 percent to almost 700 percent). Trimming the data reduces the estimates of Average Intention to Treat parameters by 2 to 3 percentage points. Finally, we notice that the share of high-protein food, for instance, is higher in treatment than in control communities in 2004.
The data provide information also on a sample of 3,528 ineligible households living in treatment and control blocks. These households are not eligible for the program because their wealth score is too high, i.e. they are not sufficiently poor to be eligible for Oportunidades.
The impact of Oportunidades on urban consumption
In this section, we discuss the identification and estimation of Average Intention to Treat effects -that is, the effect of the program on eligible households -and report the estimates of these parameters on the level and logs of total, food, and high-protein food consumption. Our aim is to provide convincing evidence that the assumptions under which we identify and estimate our treatment effects are valid. If this is the case, we can then proceed to compare these quasiexperimental estimates with the Engel curve estimates. This section draws heavily from Angelucci and Attanasio (2009).
Identification
Since poverty rates differ systematically in treatment and control areas, we need to control for unobserved determinants of consumption that differ by area to obtain credible impact estimates.
We do this by using difference-in-differences matching estimators. 
Given this notation, the following equation defines the Average Intention to Treat (AIT) effect:
This notation implicitly assumes that potential outcomes for each subject are not affected by the treatment status of others, an assumption usually referred to in the literature as the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), formalized by Rubin (1980 and 1986) . Our key identification assumption is that, conditional on a set of observed characteristics measured in a preprogram time period t = t 0 , X it 0 , area of residence is independent of the change in potential
That is, we allow residents of treatment and control blocks to have different levels of potential outcomes, but the differences are assumed to be time invariant, therefore they disappear by taking their first difference.
From the above assumptions, and dropping the subscripts for expositional ease, it follows that
where we express this parameter as a function of the propensity score P (X) = P (Z = 1|X) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983 ). If we further assume common support, i.e. P (Z = 1|X) < 1, the AIT is
This parameter is identified under the assumptions that the program has no effect in control areas, that the changes in potential consumption in treatment and control areas are independent of areas of residence, conditional on the observed variables, and that there is full common support,
It is important to provide indirect evidence in support of our identification assumption, which we do below. Before discussing the assumptions' validity, we need to discuss how we deal with our choice-based sampling design.
Dealing with a choice-based sample
To sample eligible households, the evaluation team used a poverty index built using socio-economic data from a census of all residents of the selected blocks, collected at baseline. This index was used to select households from control areas that would have been eligible for the program, had the program been implemented in such areas. The sample selection in treatment areas, however, used both the poverty index and administrative data on program enrollment, oversampling participants.
The observed fraction of eligible households enrolled in Oportunidades, therefore, is considerably higher than the true one.
We create weights following Manski and Lerman (1977) , who show how the weights are the ratio between the true (population) and observed (sample) proportion. We use the baseline census together with the administrative data on program participation to compute the true fraction of eligible households enrolled in Oportunidades by treatment block, Q. We use the sample to compute the observed fraction, H. For each block, the weight for eligible participants is Q/H, while the weight for eligible non-participants is (1−Q)/(1−H). The weight for eligible households in control blocks is 1, because those households were sampled at random (see Angelucci, Attanasio, and Shaw (2005) for further details).
To estimate our parameters of interest, therefore, we need to use two sets of weights: the above weights, to account for the oversampling of eligible participants from treatment blocks, and the matching weights, to rebalance the control areas. Our bootstrap algorithm works in the following way. First, we sample blocks at random. Second, we estimate the propensity score by probit using the choice-based weights. Third, we the psmatch2 code in Stata to generate a counterfactual potential outcome for each treatment observation with the control ones. Fourth, we compute the difference between observed and estimated counterfactual outcome for each treatment observation and estimate the AIT by weighted average using the choice-based weights.
Do the identification assumptions make sense?
The consumption of eligible households in control blocks is unlikely to be affected by the program,
given the geographic distance between the Oportunidades blocks. This is noticeable from Table 4 , which shows that most control and treatment blocks are located in different states. 8 The presence of common support is a testable assumption; therefore we proceed to see whether it is maintained in our data. We estimate the propensity score at the individual level by probit using a wide set of household characteristics in 2002 or earlier years, as listed in Table 3 We show the coefficients of the propensity score in Table 3 . These coefficients, estimated using the Manski and Lerman weights, confirm that treatment blocks are poorer than control blocks, as the households living in treatment blocks have lower wealth, a larger share of uneducated household heads, and higher likelihoods of suffering from transitory shocks (except loss of business) and of being headed by females without a partner, normally associated with high indigence. Interestingly, though, residents of treatment blocks also have higher employment rates (both as employees and self-employed) than control block residents, and their income does not differ from the income of control block residents (with the exception of 2001 income, which is higher in treatment blocks), conditional on the other observed characteristics and higher education for the spouse of the household head. Lastly, treatment and control blocks have different state GDP growth rates, confirming they are not balanced at the geographic level. In sum, this table shows the need to rebalance the observed variables between treatment and control blocks. Figure 1 shows that the common support is complete; that is, for each household in an Oportunidades block, we have a sufficiently high number of close matches from control blocks. Full common support ensures that we can compute average treatment effects for the entire sample of eligible and treated households, respectively, and not only for nonrandom subgroups of families.
We now provide indirect evidence in favor of our conditional independence assumption (CIA).
While not directly testable, the evidence provided below supports our conjecture that the CIA holds given the chosen set of conditioning variables.
The main issue for the CIA validity is whether we have successfully controlled for differential trends between treatment and control blocks, since our difference-in-differences approach controls for time-invariant unobserved differences. Our first piece of evidence justifies the need to control for state-specific variables and suggests that, while there are differential trends in income, they disappear once we condition on state GDP growth. Table 4 shows that the sampled blocks are not balanced geographically: control and treatment city blocks come from different states. These states display different business cycles, as shown by the differences in state-specific GDP growth. Table 5 shows that the lack of geographic balance in our data may be problematic, as there are differential trends in income between treatment and control blocks (we have no preprogram consumption data, so we cannot compare preprogram trends in consumption). However, this difference disappears after conditioning on GDP changes.
Our second piece of evidence confirms that adding state GDP growth to the set of variables we use to estimate the propensity score has a sizable effect on the estimated treatment effects. We show this by estimating average treatment effects on the change in log consumption for ineligible households alternatively adding and omitting preprogram state GDP growth. Since these households are not eligible for the program, we expect the treatment effect to be zero. This is exactly what we find when we condition on GDP growth: Table 6 shows that the effect of Oportunidades on ineligible households' log consumption is -0.010 and not statistically significant (column 1).
However, when we fail to control for the difference in GDP growth, we estimate a positive, statistically significant, and large treatment effect: consumption appears to be over 14 percent higher for ineligible households in treatment areas (column 2). 9
Estimates of the Average Intention to Treat effects
We estimate the 2004 AIT effects for total expenditure, food, and high-protein food (in logs).
These are the key parameters of interest for the purpose of our exercise, because we will use them to make a comparison with the predictions from the Engel curves, as we discuss later. These parameters are estimated from the same population for which we will estimate the Engel curves, using the same weighting scheme.
We employ a difference-in-differences local linear regression matching estimator with a tricube kernel. Since neither plug-in nor cross-validation bandwidth selectors seem to perform well for finite samples (Frolich 2005) , we tried many different bandwidths using log food consumption as our outcome. The counterfactual mean of the change in log consumption is roughly stable for bandwidths between 0.1 and 0.3 and between 0.6 and 0.9 (which means we use centered subsets of N × bandwidth observations, where N S is the number of observations). The difference between the various estimates is at most one percentage point. 10 We find a similar pattern when the outcome is the log of protein-rich food consumption. However, the choice of bandwidth matters more when the outcome is log consumption. We report estimates of the AIT effects using a tricube kernel and bandwidths of 0.1 and 0.6. The smaller bandwidth is our preferred one because it reduces the bias (but increases the variance) of the estimates. We provide the results from the larger bandwidth for comparative purposes.
We conduct balancing tests on the matched sample, in the spirit of Smith and Todd (2005) .
As pointed out in Lee (2006) , one should not use rigid rules in interpreting the results from these tests and rather focus on whether the differences between the treatment and control means of the propensity score covariates become smaller after matching. As such, we point out that, although the means of several rebalanced variables are statistically different, the pseudo-R 2 of the probit estimate of the propensity score drops from 0.29 for the unbalanced sample to 0.02 for the rebalanced one. Moreover, the average absolute bias decreases by one half after the rebalancing.
Based on this evidence, we consider the rebalanced control group to be similar enough to our treatment group (at least in terms of the considered covariates). 11, 12 We compute the standard errors using the block bootstrap to allow for area-specific shocks; the block is the city block. We estimate the propensity score each time we resample the data and present estimates of the standard errors using 1,000 repetitions.
The key finding is that the program increases food consumption in percentage terms more than total consumption (although this difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels), as can be seen by comparing the first two rows of Table 7 . This result differs quantitatively from the effect of CCT programs in rural Mexico (Attanasio and Lechene 2011) and in other countries' rural areas, e.g. in Colombia (Attanasio, Battistin, and Mesnard 2011), where the budget share 10 We obtained a very similar counterfactual mean to the one with local linear regression, a tricube kernel, and a bandwidth of 0.1 using three nearest neighbors with replacement and propensity score inverse weighting. 11 We experimented extensively both with changing the functional form of the covariates, e.g. using higher order polynomials in income, and with changing the set of covariates itself. In no case did we find a combination of different functional forms or a different set of covariates that further reduces the bias and the pseudo-R 2 . The detailed results of these tests are available upon request. 12 We use the Stata pstest command to perform the balancing tests. Since this code cannot perform balancing tests with a tricube kernel -which is computationally much faster to use in the estimation of the AIT than any other kernel -we perform these tests using a biweight kernel. This kernel weights the observations in a similar way to the tricube. The results discussed above are obtained using a bandwidth of 0.1. However, the results from the balancing test are minimally affected by the bandwidth choice. We thank Barbara Sianesi for making this suggestion.
of food consumption has no statistically significant increase and is roughly constant. Schady and Rosero (2008), however, find that in rural Ecuador, a CCT program increases the share of food in total expenditure.
Overall, the AIT effect of the program on consumption is about 4 percent and that on food consumption is about 7 percent, when we use a bandwidth of 0.1, and 2 percent and 5.6 percent with a bandwidth of 0.6. The last two rows of Table 7 show a large AIT effect on high-protein food consumption. These estimates are stable to the bandwidth choice and vary from about 17 percent to 24 percent, depending on how we treat households reporting zero consumption in at least one data wave. Note that the inclusion of this latter group of households increases the point estimates, suggesting that households with zero consumption are the ones for which the program causes the highest proportional increase. The total log consumption AITs are not statistically different from zero at conventional levels, unlike the other two AITs, which are much more precisely estimated.
The fact that, in many CCT programs, the share of food in consumption does not decrease is at odds with the notion that food is a necessity and, as such, should increase less than proportionally with total consumption. Some potential explanations of this fact are that food consumption might not be a necessity for some of the households in our sample. Moreover, we should worry about the different level of data quality for food and nonfood items. It is possible that the program changes the process of resource allocation within the household and, consequently, the household's demand, by giving cash transfers to women. To address these issues, we turn to the estimation of Engel curves; that is, to the relationship between expenditure shares and total expenditure.
Engel curves: identification and estimation issues
To specify and estimate Engel curves for food and high-protein food, we need to tackle a number of methodological issues. First, we need to be precise about which measures of 'total consumption' we use in the various cases. Second, we need to discuss the estimation strategy and how we deal with the possible endogeneity of total expenditure. Third, we need to specify the functional form assumptions we are going to use. We discuss these issues in turn.
Two-stage budgeting
As is well known, one can use two-stage budgeting arguments to focus on a specific subproblem of the problem faced by a consumer (or a household) in determining the allocation of resources among different commodities. When specifying the Engel curve for food, we will consider as total expenditure the amount spent on nondurable goods and services. This approach takes the total expenditure in a period as given and considers its allocation among different commodities. The standard two-stage budgeting approach takes into account the allocation of resources over time.
If resources other than nondurable consumption and services are consumed in a given period, this approach implicitly assumes that these other consumption items (such as the services from durables) and nondurables are additively separable.
Analogously, one can model the consumption of high-protein food as a function of either total nondurable consumption or total food expenditure. In the latter case, one needs to assume that food consumption is separable from the rest of consumption. This assumption allows us to avoid possible measurement problems with the nonfood items. Such an assumption might not be too far-fetched in our context, as food constitutes such an important part of the total budget.
Endogeneity of expenditure
There are several reasons why the log of total (or food) consumption can covary with the error term u, causing endogeneity problems in the estimation of equation (2). Taste shifters that could affect both total consumption and its allocation pose a first obvious problem. Measurement error in total consumption expenditure is another possible cause of inconsistency of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (2). This is potentially problematic because consumption appears both in the denominator of the dependent variable and in logarithmic form as an explanatory variable. 13 In what follows we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach. As instruments for total expenditure (or total food expenditure) we use variables that are commonly used in the literature on Engel curves: log average hourly local wages as well as log monthly household income, adding a dummy for households with missing income data.
Functional forms
The functional form is important for the way in which one can control for potential differences in prices across localities. In our data, we have no information on local prices (unlike in the Colombian data or in the rural PROGRESA data). We therefore capture potential differences in prices using geographic dummies which, in the linear case, only enter as intercept shifters. It is therefore important to establish whether the budget shares are linear functions of log expenditures or not.
Engel curves of Mexican urban poor
In this section, we present estimates of the Engel curve for food and high-protein food (meat, fish, eggs, and dairy products). For the latter variable, we consider the relationship between expenditures on protein-rich food and food consumption only. We estimate four sets of Engel curves for both food and high-protein food: before and after the start of the program -that is, in 13 Since this form of measurement error is not classical, the IV estimator is inconsistent and Lewbel (1996) suggests using a different estimator. However, Attanasio, Battistin, and Mesnard (2011) show that there is no fundamental difference between the estimates from the Lewbel and the IV estimators using data from a conditional cash transfer in Colombia similar to the one we consider here and offered to poor households with similar expenditure shares to the ones in our sample. 
That is, we control for several predetermined demographic and economic variables, as we do in the Therefore, we focus on estimating the linear specification above.
For each specification, we present both OLS and IV estimates, where the two expenditure variables are instrumented with log total income, log municipality wages, and a dummy for missing income. We notice that instrumenting is important: the IV and OLS estimates of the consumption coefficients are statistically different from each other. Table 8 While there might be different reasons behind these findings, one possibility is that the program, by targeting transfers to women, changes the process of resource allocation within the family and therefore the Engel curves. 15 We have dummies for groups of adjacent states, and not for individual states, because a large group of treatment and control areas are sampled from different states.
Treatment effects and Engel curves
The Engel curves represent a simple structural model that can be used to predict the impact of the program on the structure of consumption. Under the assumption that the difference-indifferences matching estimates of the AITs are consistent, we can use those estimates to validate the structural model. That is, we can compare the predictions from the Engel curves with the difference-in-differences matching estimates of the AITs that we estimated in Section 4.
Suppose, for instance, that expenditure shares, such as the share of food or high-protein food, are determined by the following equation:
where the index j refers to either food (f ) or high-protein food (p), the indices i and t to the household and time (we have omitted demographics and other control variables for notational simplicity). As before, the variable c it is food expenditure. The following equivalence is true:
where the parameters AIT w j and AIT ln x are the Average Intention to Treat effects on budget shares and log consumption for food shares (or log food consumption for high-protein food shares).
This equivalence suggests that if we multiply the estimate of the program impact on ln(x it ) from Section 4, AIT ln x , by the estimate of the Engel curve coefficient of log expenditure, θ j 1 , we should obtain an estimate of the Average Intent to Treat on budget shares, AIT w j . That is, if both the difference-in-differences matching estimates and the Engel curve estimates are consistent, the two sets of estimates of AIT w j should not be statistically different.
In the previous section, however, we saw that for each of our two outcomes of interest (food shares and high-protein food shares) we have four different estimates of the Engel curve parameters relevant for the prediction in equation (5) Tables 8 and 9 ). If the household demand theory under which the Engel curve was derived is correct, the four estimates should be the same (or not statistically different), as they all refer to the same underlying structural relationship between log expenditure and budget shares and one could use any of them. Conversely, if the households in our sample behave in a way inconsistent with the unitary model, the estimated Engel curve is misspecified and there is no reason why the estimate of θ j 1 AIT ln x should be the same as the estimate of AIT w j .
The fact that the shape of the Engel curves changes in treatment areas after the introduction of the program in 2003 implies that we will obtain different predictions. Table 10 reports our predictions of the impact of the program on the share of food in total expenditure and of the share of high protein food in total food expenditure using each of the estimates we obtained in Tables 8 and 9 .
The table reports the various estimates of the AIT for the budget share of food in total consumption, AIT w f , and of high-protein food in total food, AIT w p . We begin by reporting the difference-in-differences matching estimates of this parameter (column 1), estimated under the assumptions and methods discussed in Section 4. We then compute the same parameters using the estimated slope from three different Engel curves -the 2002 curve estimated for the treatment area (column 2) and the 2002 and 2004 curves estimated for the control areas (columns 3 and 4) -multiplied by the difference-in-differences matching estimates of AIT ln x shown in Table 7 (were this parameter is the AIT effect on log total consumption for the food budget share and the AIT effect on log food consumption for the high-protein food budget share). As before, we report two sets of estimates, produced using alternatively bandwidths of 0.1 and 0.6. The results are not sensitive to the bandwidth choice.
Our preferred comparison is the one between the estimates from the first two columns. The two estimates of the same parameters should not be statistically different if (i) the difference-indifferences matching estimates of the treatment effects are consistent and if (ii) we can interpret the estimate of the slope of the Engel curve as a structural parameter, i.e. as being an accurate representation of the behavior of the households in our sample. For the former, the crucial nontestable hypothesis in this case is that, conditional on observed characteristics, the change in potential outcomes in the absence of the treatment is independent of the area of residence. The tests we performed provide some indirect evidence that this hypothesis holds in our data. We will judge the ability of the Engel curves to predict changes in consumption shares as indirect evidence on the stability of the structural parameters.
We first notice that both for total food shares and for the shares of high protein food, the estimates from columns 2 to 4 do not appear to be statistically different from each other. However, they are different from the AIT estimates we report in column 1. In the case of the food share, the Engel curves predict a modest decline between 0.2 percent and 0.4 percent. However, the AIT estimates imply an increase in the share between 1.8 and 2.4 points. The relatively low precision of these estimates makes the differences only marginally significant. However, the evidence is much more dramatic for the share of high protein food in total food. For this commodity, the Engel curve implies an increase in the share between 0.4 percent and 0.7 percent (which is at best marginally significantly different from zero). The AIT instead implies a much larger increase, between 3.9 percent and 4.1 percent. These estimates are statistically different from those implied by the structural model and therefore imply a strong rejection of the model. 16 These findings constitute strong evidence that the Engel curve derived from a unitary model is misspecified, in the sense that it is not able to predict the impact of the program in treatment areas.
The failure of the Engel curves to predict the impact of the program is consistent with the apparent structural shift in its parameters between 2002 and 2004 in treatment areas. The issue, of course, is why one would get different parameter estimates and how we interpret these differences.
From a theoretical point of view, if the AIDS structure is an adequate representation within a unitary framework of the allocation of resources within the household, changes in relative prices could induce differences in intercepts but not in the slope of the Engel curve we estimated. 17 In the absence of systematic changes in prices, the intercepts should also be stable.
Our findings that the Engel curve fails to predict the change in food consumption observed after the introduction of the CCT is similar to the evidence from other CCT programs -e.g. For these households, the Engel curve should be stable over time and the different estimates of the same parameter should not be statistically and qualitatively different from each other.
We identify such households as those in which the female is designated as the head of household, as the husband is not present in 2002, and in which the income of the head accounts for at least 60 percent of total income. We include the second restriction to avoid considering situations in which the mother lives with older adults who might have some decision-making power. A similar exercise was performed by Schady and Rosero (2008) for Ecuador. Table 11 shows the high-protein food consumption AIT (column 1) estimated with local linear regressions matching, a tricube kernel, and bandwidths of 0.1 and 0.6 (top and bottom panels) for a sample of 746 households. Columns 2 to 4 predict the impact of the program on the share of high-protein food using the estimated Engel curves in the same way as described for Table 10 .
The size of the program effect on the share of high-protein food consumption varies between 2.4 and 3.5 percentage points and is not statistically different from the size of the effect observed in the whole sample, although its point estimate is slightly lower. However, unlike the results for the whole sample, it is no longer statistically different from the estimates in columns 2 to 4, obtained by multiplying the estimated treatment effect on log food consumption by the estimate of the slope of the Engel curve for single, female-headed households. While it is true that, given the reduced size of the sample, the estimates in Table 11 are not extremely precise, the point estimates in the four columns are of the same order of magnitude, unlike the point estimates in Table 10 .
These findings are consistent with our interpretation of the results presented in Section 7 -namely that the traditional Engel curve is misspecified for the whole sample because the unitary household model is not an adequate representation of household behavior. Establishing that the Engel curves do not change for households in which the female is already the main decision-maker discredits the competing explanation that Oportunidades may change preferences for a healthy diet by either transmitting knowledge about nutrition or providing preventative health care.
Conclusions
This paper uses the policy change caused by the introduction of Oportunidades, Mexico's flagship welfare program, to study the demand for food and for high-protein food among poor urban households eligible for this program. We model their demand using a theory-consistent, stateof-the-art demand system and estimate it paying due care to a number of methodological and econometric issues. We investigate whether eligible households' demand for total food and for high-protein food changes in a way consistent with the prediction from the Engel curves estimated using preprogram consumption.
We find that eligible households consume much more food and, in particular, much more highprotein food than would be predicted by a standard Engel curve, estimated on data from the same population observed before the beginning of the program. The fact that women start to control a sizable proportion of the family income seems to induce a change in the way households allocate total expenditure among different commodities.
These findings, together with others in this literature, call for a new, theory-consistent demand model that does not assume a unitary household. These findings also have important policy implications, especially if the transfers policy-makers are concerned with are targeted to specific economically weak agents in the population, such as women. 
A Variables description (not for publication)

Consumption. Food includes:
• Starch -Maize tortillas, bread, pasta, kidney beans, rice, potato chips, flour, corn, other cereals, etc.
• Protein -Red meat, chicken, pork, canned fish, fresh fish, seafood, eggs, milk, cheese, other animal products.
• Fruit and vegetables -Tomatoes, onions, potatoes, chile peppers, carrots, pumpkin, bananas, apples, oranges, other fruits and vegetables.
• High-fat/high-sugar food, or processed food, or food with poor nutritional content -Sugar, soft drinks, water purification tablets, coffee, vegetable oil, fried potatoes, fried pig skin, other manufactured food.
• Food eaten outside the home.
Household Income. We add incomes for the main and second job of all household members and other sources such as other jobs, pensions, and compensations. Incomes from domestic helpers and their relatives, and from individuals whose relationship to other family members is missing, are not included. blocks. The null hypothesis is that the difference in means is zero. The standard errors of the differences in means are clustered at the city block level. 9,937 observations. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level. the control and treatment blocks. The null hypothesis is that the difference in means is zero. The standard errors of the differences in means are clustered at the city block level. The sample size varies from 7,713 to 9,415 observations depending on which variables we consider. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level. OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the city block level. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
We pool data from 2000 to 2002 (the earliest income data we have are from 1999, so we can compute income growth from 2000). Notes: Standard errors estimated with the block-bootstrap (1000 repetitions). The block is the city block. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level. Matching estimates using local linear regression and a bandwidth of 0.6. Block-bootstrap standard errors in brackets, the block is the city block. 1000 repetitions. Local linear regression matching estimates with a tricube kernel and bandwidths of 0.1 and 0.6. We took the difference in log consumption Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the city block level. The covariates are listed after equation (3) in the text. Excluded instruments are log total income, log municipality wages, and a dummy for missing income. The coefficients of the X variables may differ for different household groups. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level. Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the city block level. The covariates are listed after equation (3) in the text. Excluded instruments are log total income, log municipality wages, and a dummy for missing income. The coefficients of the X variables may differ for different household groups. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level. with the block-bootstrap, the block is the city block. 1,000 repetitions. Local linear regression matching estimates of the AITs with a tricube kernel and bandwidths of 0.1 and 0.6. IV estimates of the β parameters. Excluded instruments are log total income, log municipality wages, and a dummy for missing income. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level. Notes: f c=food consumption. Standard errors estimated with the block-bootstrap, the block is the city block. 1,000
repetitions. Local linear regression matching estimates of the AITs with a tricube kernel and bandwidths of 0.1 and 0.6. IV estimates of the β parameters. Excluded instruments are log total income, log municipality wages, and a dummy for missing income. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level. The sample size is 746. We consider single female household heads who earn at least 60 percent of the household income.
